Monkey Selfie and Authorship in Copyright Law: The Nigerian and South African Perspectives by Ncube, Caroline B & Oriakhogba, Desmond O
CB NCUBE & DO ORIAKHOGBA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 A photograph taken by a monkey is in the centre of a copyright claim 
in the famous monkey selfie case in the United States of America. 
Suing as next friend of the monkey, named Naruto, the People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals contended that copyright in the 
photograph belongs to the monkey as author of the photograph since 
the monkey created the photograph unaided by any person. On the 
motion of the defendants, the case was dismissed by the US district 
court on the ground that the concept of authorship under US Copyright 
Act cannot be defined to include non-human animals. The dismissal 
order was confirmed by a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeal 
of Ninth Circuit a request for an appeal before a panel of eleven judges 
of the appellate court was denied. This paper reviews the case in the 
light of the concept of authorship and ownership, with specific focus on 
the authorship of photographs, under the Nigerian Copyright Act and 
South African Copyright Act. In so doing, it examines and relies on 
Ginsburg's six principles for testing authorship to test the authorship of 
photographs under the Acts. It also relies on the concepts of subjective 
rights and legal personality to explain the implication of conferring 
copyright ownership on non-human animals. It argues that for 
authorship of and ownership of the copyright in a photograph to be 
established under the Nigerian Copyright Act and South African 
Copyright Act, a legal person must have created the photograph. 
Consequently, for the purposes of argument, the paper proceeds on 
the assumption that the monkey selfie case originated from Nigeria or 
South Africa. After analysing relevant statutory provisions and case 
law, the paper finds that the Nigerian Copyright Act and the South 
African Copyright Act do not envisage the conferral of authorship in 
particular, and copyright protection in general, to a non-human animal. 
It then concludes that the courts in both countries would not reach a 
different conclusion from the one made by the US courts. 
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1 Introduction 
The development of copyright law and policy has been shaped by 
technological advancement. History shows how the development of the 
printing press, vinyl/phono records and computer technology, among other 
things, informed changes in copyright law and policy both at the 
international and local levels.1 Although highly unthinkable before now, the 
possibility of non-human animals2 claiming copyright protection has recently 
emerged. Through the help of photograph technology, a monkey took a 
photograph of itself resulting in a work protectable under copyright law. This 
led to a chain of events resulting in the celebrated monkey selfie case.3 The 
case questions the extent to which the foundational concepts of authorship 
and the related concept of ownership can be stretched under copyright law. 
Specifically, it raises the issue whether the author of a work and owner of 
the copyright under copyright law can be defined to include a non-human 
animal author. 
This paper will review the monkey selfie case against the backdrop of the 
concept of authorship and ownership under the Nigerian Copyright Act4 and 
South African Copyright Act (SA Copyright Act).5 The Nigerian Copyright 
Act and SA Copyright Act share some similarity in that both of them originate 
from British copyright law because of their colonial history, which is 
                                            
* Caroline B Ncube. LLB (UZ) LLM (Cantab) PhD (UCT). Professor. University of Cape 
Town. DST/NRF/Nedbank SARChI Research Chair in Intellectual Property, 
Innovation and Development in the Commercial Law Department, Faculty of Law, 
University of Cape Town. E-mail: caroline.ncube@uct.ac.za. This work is based on 
the research supported in part by the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South 
Africa. Any opinion, finding and conclusion or recommendation expressed in this 
material is that of the author and the NRF does not accept any liability in this regard. 
**  Desmond O Oriakhogba. LLB (Uniben); LLM (Uniben); BL (Nigeria). PhD Candidate. 
University of Cape Town. Visiting Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, 
Canada. Lecturer, University of Benin, Nigeria. Queen Elizabeth Scholar and Open 
AIR Fellow. E-mail: ORKDES001@myuct.ac.za.  
1  Adewopo Nigerian Copyright System 3-6; Adewopo According to Intellectual 
Property; Oriakhogba and Fenemigho 2014 NAUJILJ 179. 
2  The expression "non-human animals" is preferred because the phrases "non-human 
authors or owners of copyright" will give the impression that Nigerian and South 
African copyright law recognises the authorship and ownership of all non-humans 
including non-human animals. This paper is meant to show otherwise: ie, copyright 
law recognises the authorship and ownership only of human beings (natural 
persons) and corporations (juristic persons), excluding non-human animals. 
3  Naruto v David Slater (unreported) case number 15-cv-04324-WHO of 28 January 
2016 (hereafter, Naruto v Slater). 
4  Copyright Act Cap C28 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (hereafter, NCA or 
Nigerian Copyright Act). 
5  Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (hereafter, SA Copyright Act). 
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adequately recorded elsewhere.6 In addition, as will be shown in the course 
of this paper, they appear to share similar standards for determining 
authorship. To this end, the paper will begin by giving a background of and 
will briefly analyse the monkey selfie case. It will then examine the concept 
of authorship in Nigeria and South Africa against the backdrop of 
Ginsburg's7 six principles for determining authorship. To give further 
perspective, the concept of authorship and ownership will be examined 
through the lens of the concept of subjective rights. The discussion will form 
the background for determining whether the concepts of authorship and 
ownership as they relate to photographs can be stretched to include non-
human animals assuming that the monkey selfie case arose in Nigeria or 
South Africa. It will end with some concluding remarks.  
The paper does not discuss the question whether copyright subsists in the 
selfie or whether it belongs to the public domain as argued by Wikimedia 
Foundation. Guadamuz8 has already addressed this from a UK and 
European Union (EU) perspective, and Guadamuz rightly concluded that 
"there is a very strong argument to be made for the subsistence of copyright 
in the monkey selfie".9 Examining the matter only from an EU perspective, 
Rosati10 seems to agree with Guadamuz. According to Rosati, while the 
idea of authorship in copyright law generally refers to human beings, the  
Monkey Selfie case raises important issues that will likely become more 
sensitive in the foreseeable future. The question of non-human authorship is 
not really (or just) about whether a monkey can be the owner of copyright in 
the photographs that it takes, but whether increasingly sophisticated 
technologies, under the umbrella of artificial intelligence, would result in the 
broadening of the understanding of what (rather than who) an author is.11 
However, Logue12 had earlier contended that David Slater "would probably 
fail in his copyright claim" before the Irish courts if the courts apply the EU 
originality standard (highlighted below), "unless he could show that he 
processed the [monkey selfie] and that such processing itself was 
original".13 Nonetheless, it would be otherwise if the traditional UK sweat of 
the brow test were applied. The concern here is to determine whether the 
                                            
6  For the history of the Nigerian Copyright Act, see Adewopo Nigerian Copyright 
System. For the SA Copyright Act, see Dean Handbook of South African Copyright 
Law 1-1. 
7  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063 
8  Guadamuz 2016 IP Review 1. 
9  Guadamuz 2016 IP Review. 
10  Rosati 2017 JIPLP 973. 
11  Rosati 2017 JIPLP 973, 977. 
12  Logue 2014 LSG 26. 
13  Logue 2014 LSG 26, 29. 
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authorship and ownership of such a photograph can be conferred on the 
monkey under the Nigerian Copyright Act and SA Copyright Act, assuming 
that the case arose in either country. 
2 The "Monkey Selfie" case 
David Slater, a British photographer, travelled to the Tangkoko Reserve in 
North Sulawesi, Indonesia in 2011 to take some pictures. He followed a 
band of monkeys with the aim of getting close range shots of their faces 
with the help of a wide-angled lens. As expected, he could not get close to 
the monkeys as they were shy of him. Even so, he got a few shots that were 
not close to what he wanted. However, he discovered the monkeys were 
interested in his photography equipment; so he placed his camera on a 
tripod. The monkeys came close and clicked the shutter, leading to some 
photographs of not too good quality.14 
David Slater then altered the position of the camera, which changed the 
reflection of the lens and drew the attention of a camera-happy monkey – a 
six-year-old crested macaque. The clicking of the camera's shutter by the 
monkey gave birth to the now famous monkey selfie, among others. 
According to reports, David Slater referred to the picture as "an astounding, 
once-in-a-lifetime shot that captured an expression of pure joy and self-
awareness on the monkey's face".15 
Upon his return from Indonesia, David Slater got the Monkey Selfie 
published in the Daily Mail from where it went viral online and was picked 
up by Wikimedia Foundation who published it on its commons site. This 
gave rise to a dispute between Wikimedia Foundation and David Slater in 
2014, as he demanded the removal of the photograph from the site. 
Wikimedia Foundation did not honour the demand on the basis that since 
the photograph had been taken by a monkey, copyright protection does not 
apply, and as such, the picture belonged to the public domain.16 
David Slater then published and sold a book containing copies of the 
monkey selfie through his publishing company in the United States of 
America (US). This drew the attention of People for the Ethical Treatment 
                                            
14  Guadamuz 2018 http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2018/01/article_0007.html; 
Wallis 2015 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/weird-news/monkey-who-took-
grinning-selfie-should-received-damages-for-copyright-infringement-says-peta-
10513612.html#gallery. 
15  Guadamuz 2018 http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2018/01/article_0007.html. 
16  Logue 2014 LSG 26; Guadamuz 2018 http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/ 
2018/01/article_0007.html. 
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of Animals (PETA),17 which claimed that copyright in the photograph 
belonged to the monkey as its author, since the monkey created it through 
"a series of purposeful and voluntary actions [...] unaided by Slater".18 PETA 
identified the monkey as Naruto and instituted a copyright infringement suit 
under the US Copyright Act, 1976, as Naruto's next friend, in the US District 
Court of San Francisco in 2015 in the case of Naruto v David Slater.19 
According to Guadamuz:20 
[The] case is not isolated, it seems to be part of a wider campaign by PETA to 
try to establish rights for animals, but it is still possible to analyse the litigation 
at face value as a copyright case, even though we suspect that the intention 
is not at all about to establish animal ownership rights.  
Whatever may be PETA's motivation for the suit, the primary concern here 
is the copyright claim. The facts of the case are now already apparent from 
the discussion so far. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert that the defendants 
contravened sections 106 and 501 of the US Copyright Act "by displaying, 
advertising, reproducing, distributing, offering for sale, and selling copies of 
the monkey selfies".21 They also claimed that Naruto is entitled to the 
defendants' profits from the infringement, and sought to permanently enjoin 
the defendants from copying, licensing, or otherwise exploiting the monkey 
selfies and to permit the Next Friends to administer and protect Naruto's 
authorship of and copyright in the photograph.22 In their response, the 
defendants filed a notice to dismiss because not being human, Naruto does 
not have standing and cannot make a claim under the US Copyright Act. 
To demonstrate standing under article III of the US Constitution, a plaintiff 
must show that:23  
(i) It has suffered an "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized and 
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (ii) the injury is "fairly 
traceable" to the challenged action of the defendants; and (iii) a favourable 
decision will be likely to redress the injury.  
                                            
17  For information about PETA, see PETA 2018 https://www.peta.org/about-peta/. 
18  Wallis 2015 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/weird-news/monkey-who-took-
grinning-selfie-should-received-damages-for-copyright-infringement-says-peta-
10513612.html#gallery. 
19  See Naruto v Slater. 
20  Guadamuz 2016 IP Review. 
21  Naruto v Slater 2. 
22  Naruto v Slater 2. 
23  Naruto v Slater 3. 
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The district court did not determine if Naruto fulfilled these requirements. It 
held that it was important to first determine whether Naruto has standing 
under the US Copyright Act.24  
The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the suit. In 
reaching this judgment, the district court referred to sections 101 and 102 of 
the US Copyright Act. Section 102 confers protection on an original work of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. On the 
other hand, section 101 requires that the fixing of a work can be by, or on 
the authority of, the author. The district court recognised the fact that the US 
Copyright Act does not define "author" and "works of authorship". It held 
that this was done with the purpose of allowing some flexibility in the 
definition of the term.25 Even so, the district court held that the legislature 
did not intend to extend the definition of author to non-human animals and 
that even the US courts have interpreted the concept limitedly to include 
only persons or human beings. It took further cognisance of the practice of 
the US Copyright Office to the effect that works created by non-human 
animals are not protected under the US Copyright Act.26 The district court 
made the following pronouncement, through Orrick J:  
Naruto is not an 'author' within the meaning of the [US Copyright Act]. 
[Plaintiffs] argue that this result is 'antithetical' to the 'tremendous [public] 
interest in animal art.' Perhaps. But that is an argument that should be made 
to Congress and the President [...]. The issue [...] is whether [Plaintiffs] have 
demonstrated that the [US Copyright Act] confers standing upon Naruto. In 
light of the plain language of the [US Copyright Act], past judicial 
interpretations of the [US Copyright Act]'s authorship requirement, and 
guidance from the [USCO], they have not.27 
PETA filed an appeal before the Ninth Circuit of the US Court of Appeal. 
However, PETA and David Slater settled the matter before the appellate 
court could hear the appeal. They then filed a joint motion urging the 
appellate court to dismiss the appeal and vacate the district court's order. 
As part of the settlement, David Slater agreed to donate 25 per cent of:  
                                            
24  Naruto v Slater 3. 
25  Naruto v Slater 4. 
26  Naruto v Slater 5-6. Also see USCO 2014 
https://copyright.gov/comp3/chap300/ch300-copyrightable-authorship.pdf 306. 
27  Naruto v Slater 6. 
CB NCUBE & DO ORIAKHOGBA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  7 
 
Any future gross revenue that he derives from using or selling any or all of the 
monkey selfies to registered charities dedicated to protecting the welfare or 
habitat of Naruto and other crested macaques in Indonesia.28  
In their joint statement announcing the settlement, the parties agreed that 
the case "raises important, cutting-edge issues about expanding legal rights 
for non-human animals". Also, that for Naruto "and all other animals", 
"appropriate fundamental legal rights" should be recognised "for them as 
our fellow global occupants and members of their own nations who want 
only to live their lives and be with their families."29  
According to Pavis,30 despite the settlement, the door for litigation on the 
monkey selfie is still left open for two reasons. First, the appellate court had 
not dismissed the appeal at the time of the agreement. Secondly, the 
"statement makes no mention of a reconciliation between the parties on who 
they regard to be the author of the photograph and owner of its copyright."31 
Another reason may be that, being a dismissal order, and not a judgement 
on the merit, it appears the district court's pronouncement on the issue of 
non-human animal's authorship may not be regarded as a conclusion of the 
matter. This is so because the district court did not declare David Slater as 
the author and owner of the photograph. The district court only focused on 
the motion filed by David Slater.32 Moreover, the district court seemed to 
acknowledge that Naruto may have some right in the Monkey Selfie since 
Naruto created the photograph 
by 'independent, autonomous action' in examining and manipulating Slater's 
unattended camera and 'purposely pushing' the shutter release multiple times, 
'understanding the cause-and-effect relationship between pressing the shutter 
release, the noise of the shutter, and the change to his reflection in the camera 
lens'.33 
Most importantly, the appellate court declined to dismiss the appeal for 
several reasons.34 The appellate court took cognisance of the fact that 
                                            
28  Perle 2017 https://www.peta.org/media/news-releases/peta-statement-monkey-
selfie-case-settled/; Pavis 2017 http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.za/2017/09/the-selfie-
monkey-case-end.html; Osborne 2017 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ 
americas/monkey-selfie-david-slater-photographer-peta-copyright-image-camera-
wildlife-personalities-macaques-a7941806.html. 
29  Perle 2017 https://www.peta.org/media/news-releases/peta-statement-monkey-
selfie-case-settled/. 
30  Pavis 2017 http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.za/2017/09/the-selfie-monkey-case-end.html. 
31  Pavis 2017 http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.za/2017/09/the-selfie-monkey-case-end.html. 
32  Guadamuz 2016 IP Review. 
33  See Naruto v Slater 2. 
34  Naruto v David Slater (unreported) case number 16-15469, ID: 10835881, DktEntry: 
59 of 13 April 2018 (hereafter, Naruto v Slater II). Also see Jeong 2018 
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Naruto is not a party to the settlement between PETA and David Slater. 
Thus, according to the appellate court, "it appears the settlement agreement 
would not bar another attempt to file a new action".35 Several other reasons 
were advanced by the appellate court, per Hon. Robreno DJ (District 
Judge), for denying the joint motion. First, the appellate court held that a 
motion to dismiss an appeal on settlement reached by parties is not 
mandatory and the order is not granted as a matter of course because in 
certain instances it is inadvisable.36 Secondly, a substantive ruling "in this 
developing area of the law would help guide the lower courts".37 Thirdly, the 
case had: 
Been fully briefed and argued by both sides and the court has expended 
considerable resources to come to a resolution. Denying the motion to dismiss 
ensures that the investment of public resources already devoted to this 
litigation will have some return.38  
Finally, refusing the "motion to dismiss and declining to vacate the lower 
court judgment prevents the parties from manipulating precedent in a way 
that suits their institutional preferences."39  
Indeed, the appellate court handed down a substantive ruling on the matter 
shortly after it declined to dismiss the appeal.40 Through a three-judge 
panel, the appellate court confirmed the ruling of the district court. The 
appellate court held that Naruto had standing under article III of the US 
Constitution because the case shows the existence of a controversy based 
on the plaintiff's allegation that Naruto was the author and owner of the 
monkey selfie and that Naruto had suffered concrete and particular harm.41 
However, the appellate court held that the allegations are not enough to 
confer standing on Naruto since the US Copyright Act did not expressly vest 
non-human animals with standing to sue for copyright infringement. 
According to the appellate court, per Bea CJ (Circuit Judge),  
[I]f an Act of Congress plainly states that animals have statutory standing, then 
animals have statutory standing. If the statute does not so plainly state, then 
animals do not have statutory standing. The Copyright Act does not expressly 
authorize animals to file copyright infringement suits under the statute. 
                                            
http://www.theverge.com/platform/amp/2018/4/13/17235486/monkey-selfie-lawsuit-
ninth-circuit-motion-to-dismiss-denied?_twitter_impression=true. 
35  Naruto v Slater II 5. 
36  Naruto v Slater II 1. 
37  Naruto v Slater II 2. 
38  Naruto v Slater II 3. 
39  Naruto v Slater II 4. 
40  Naruto v David Slater (unreported) case number 16-15469, ID: 10845881, DktEntry: 
62-1 of 23 April 2018 (hereafter, Naruto v Slater III). 
41  Naruto v Slater III 10. 
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Therefore. [...] the district court did not err in concluding that Naruto—and, 
more broadly, animals other than humans—lack statutory standing to sue 
under the Copyright Act.42 
In addition to the above reason, the appellate court upheld the ruling of the 
district court on the ground that PETA does not have a sufficient relationship 
with Naruto to sue as Naruto's next friend under US law. Moreover, US law 
does not allow the representation of a non-human animal by a next friend.43 
Shortly after the ruling, a judge made a request for a vote by the appellate 
court on whether to hear the case en banc.44 An en banc hearing ordinarily 
means a hearing by a full court. However, since the appellate court in this 
case is very large, it usually undertakes en banc hearings by a panel of 11 
judges.45 Based on the request, the appellate court ordered parties to the 
case to "file simultaneous briefs setting forth their respective positions on 
whether the case should be reheard en banc".46 On 31 August 2018, the 
vote denied an en banc. 
3 Authorship under the Nigerian Copyright Act and the SA 
Copyright Act 
At some point in the evolution of copyright law, authorship was viewed as a 
process of inspiration or motivation of creativity by some forces on the 
author. It was seen as the expression of the author's personality and identity 
through the works produced by the author.47 According to this view, authors 
are geniuses who create works without drawing from the existing culture 
and knowledge in the society in which they live. However, the modern view 
sees authorship as a creative process that flows from facts, experiences 
and knowledge existing in the author's society.48 A discussion of the concept 
of authorship must of necessity involve answering the question: who is an 
author?  
                                            
42  Naruto v Slater III 16-18. 
43  Naruto v Slater III 7-15. 
44  Naruto v David Slater (unreported) case number 16-15469, ID: 10886635, DktEntry: 
63 of 25 May 2018 (hereafter, Naruto v Slater IV). 
45  See Masnick 2018 https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180525/23110739918/ 
monkey-selfie-lawsuit-will-never-ever-die-appeals-court-judge-wants-do-over.shtml. 
46  Naruto v Slater IV. 
47  Kwall 2007 Hous L Rev 871; Campbell 2006 http://eprints.rclis.org/8569/1/ 
Campbell_ASIST_06_final.pdf. 
48  Yen "Interdisciplinary Future" 159-174; Ng 2008 HCELJ 377. 
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The author is the foundation and the heart of modern copyright law.49 The 
subsistence and life span of copyright is determined by reference to the 
author.50 Entitlements to copyright are rooted in the author. The right to first 
and subsequent ownership of a work generally derives from the author. The 
author and owner of a copyright work are often the same person. The author 
is generally regarded as the first owner of a copyright work, but the author 
is not always the owner of a work.51 The distinction lies in the difference 
between one who expresses an idea in a material form and the other who 
invests in the trading of the material form in which an idea is expressed.52  
There is no generally accepted answer to the author question. Although 
authors are recognised as the centrepiece of copyright protection at the 
international level, copyright treaties appear to reserve the author question 
for determination in national laws. Article 7 of the Berne Convention 
recognises the author as the reference point for the determination of the 
duration for copyright protection.53 However, the Berne Convention merely 
states in Article 15 that the appearance of a person's name on a work is 
sufficient to regard such a person as an author in order to clothe him/her 
with the entitlement to institute copyright infringement proceedings. WIPO 
attempted to answer the author question in 1990.54 WIPO's draft model 
copyright law attempted a definition, which would incorporate the divergent 
views of what would amount to authorship. Although the attempt failed due 
to disagreements among member states, the definition proffered by the 
expert committee on the draft law provides some insights pertaining to 
answering the question. According to the expert committee, an author is: 
The physical person who has created the work. Reference to 'author' includes, 
in addition to the author, where applicable, also the successors in title of the 
author and, where the original owner of the rights in the work is a person other 
than the author, such person.55  
From a critical look at this definition, it would be easy to guess why WIPO's 
attempt failed. First, it seems to conflate authorship with ownership by 
including successors in title of the copyright in a work within the scope of its 
definition. One does not become an author merely by being a successor in 
                                            
49  Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-31 para 4.1; Ginsburg 2003 DLR 
1063; Cornish 2002 CJLA 2; Ng 2008 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 377. 
50  Sections 1, 2 and First Schedule of the Nigerian Copyright Act; ss 2 and 3 of the SA 
Copyright Act. 
51  Section 10 of the Nigerian Copyight Act; s 21 of the SA Copyright Act. 
52  Ng 2008 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 377. 
53  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886). 
54  WIPO Draft Model Law on Copyright (1990). 
55  WIPO Draft Model Law on Copyright (1990) 19-21. 
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title to a deceased author. Authorship, as will be shown shortly, requires 
some positive acts. Secondly, it also tends to include juristic persons within 
its definitional scope without limiting the extent to which and the particular 
works for which juristic persons may properly be clothed with authorship. 
Dean regards an author as a "person who is responsible for the creation of 
the material embodiment" of a work through an activity that involves the 
"application of intellectual effort or skill".56 He contends further that while 
only natural persons can be regarded as authors in relation to some works 
like literary, artistic and musical works, it is possible to have juristic persons 
as authors in relation to cinematograph films and sound recordings.57 This 
definition seems to accord with that of Asein,58 who believes that "the author 
of a work is the person who created the work or made the production of the 
work possible and he need not always be a human beneficiary." However, 
Ginsburg59 prefers to look at "author" differently as follows:  
an author is (or should be) a human creator who, notwithstanding the 
constraints of her task, succeeds in exercising minimal personal autonomy in 
her fashioning of the work. Because, and to the extent that, she moulds the 
work to her vision [...], she is entitled not only to recognition and payment, but 
to exert some artistic control over it.  
By Ginsburg's definition, there is no room for juristic persons in the definition 
of authors. She takes this stance because according to her it would lead to 
considerable incoherence as regarding juristic persons, as it would mean 
equating authorship with ownership.60 Nonetheless, the author developed 
six principles for resolving the author question. As shown in the discussion 
of her principles below, a juristic person can qualify as an author in 
appropriate circumstances. The principles will be useful in determining the 
author question in relation to the monkey selfie from the Nigerian and South 
African perspectives. 
3.1 Ginsburg's principles  
Ginsburg's six principles for determining authorship are very apt because 
the scholar formulated them after examining the copyright laws and judicial 
authorities from several jurisdictions in Europe and America, including the 
UK, which shaped the Nigerian and South African copyright laws. The 
principles have been adopted elsewhere as appropriate guides for the 
                                            
56  Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-32 para 4.3. 
57  Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-35 para 4.6. 
58  Asein 2007 IIC 299. 
59  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
60  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063.  
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purpose of determining the author question.61 According to the Ginsburg, 
the six principles may not apply at once. Rather, "although the first three 
may seem coherent, discrepancies, dissonances, and significant 
incompatibilities appear not only across the remaining three, but also even 
within each principle enunciated."62  
The first principle of authorship is that which places "mind over muscle".63 
According to Ginsburg, the person who conceptualises and directs the 
development of the work is the author, rather than the person who simply 
follows orders to execute the work.64 An author conceives of the work and 
supervises or otherwise exercises control over its execution.65 The second 
principle of authorship "vaunts mind over machine". The participation of a 
machine or device, such as computers, in the making of a work need not 
deprive its creator of authorship status. However, the degree of involvement 
of the machine in the making of the work is an important consideration. Is 
the machine merely a tool in the process? Alternatively, is the machine 
responsible mainly for shaping the content and form of the work? The 
"greater the machine's role in the work's production, the more the 'author' 
must show how her role determined the work's form and content."66  
The third principle equates authorship with originality, while the fourth 
principle relates to the determination of the level of effort or labour exerted 
by the person in creating the work. According to Ginsburg, "the author need 
not be creative, so long as she perspires."67 Both the third and fourth 
principles relate to the concept of originality, which will be briefly discussed 
shortly. The fifth principle was influenced by Nimmer's work.68 The principle 
introduces intent to be an author as a condition for ascribing authorship to 
the person. Accordingly, "only those who [...] intend to impress the stamp of 
their own personalities on their literary and artistic efforts should be entitled 
to authorship status; all the rest are merely craftsmen, not true creators."69 
Ginsburg contends that intent does not make a person more or less creative 
but "it may supply a means to set out the equities of ownership in cases in 
which more than one contender is vying for authorship status."70 The sixth 
                                            
61  Oriakhogba 2015 SAIPLJ 40; Ng 2008 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 377. 
62  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
63  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
64  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
65  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
66  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
67  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
68  Nimmer 2001 Hous L Rev 1. 
69  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
70  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
CB NCUBE & DO ORIAKHOGBA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  13 
 
principle is the presumption of authorship in favour of the person who 
provides the money, resources and platform for the creation of the work. 
The principle raises a justification for the "employer/commissioning party 
authorship" especially for jurisdictions that have the work-for-hire rule in 
their copyright law.71 
3.2 Authorship under the Nigerian Copyright Act 
The Nigerian Copyright Act does not generally define the term author but 
merely proffers pointers to whom an author is in relation to particular works. 
Under the Nigerian Copyright Act, the author of a literary, artistic or musical 
work is the person who creates the work.72 The Nigerian Copyright Act 
defines the author of a cinematographic film as the person who arranges for 
the making of the film or sound recording. However, the parties to the 
making of the film or sound recording may, by agreement, confer authorship 
on another person.73 
Similarly, the Nigerian Copyright Act defines author in respect of a sound 
recording to mean the person who made arrangements for the making of 
the sound recording. However, where the sound recording is from a musical 
work, the author is the artist in whose name the recording was made. 
According to Asein, "this is a pro-author provision"74 and it is aimed at 
protecting a performer who is also the composer of the musical work 
contained in the sound recording. In either case, the parties to the making 
of the sound recording may, by agreement, confer authorship of the sound 
recording on a person who is neither the artist nor made arrangements for 
making the sound recording.  
Furthermore, under the Nigerian Copyright Act, the author of a broadcast 
means the person by whom arrangements for the making of the broadcast 
or transmission were undertaken.75 A computer programme is protected 
under the Nigerian Copyright Act as a literary work.76 Thus, the definition of 
the author of a literary work applies to the authors of computer programmes 
in Nigeria. Authorship relating to photographs will be discussed shortly in 
the sixth part below. 
                                            
71  Ginsburg 2003 DePaul L Rev 1063. 
72  Section 51(1) of the NCA. 
73  Section 51(1) of the NCA. 
74  Asein Nigerian Copyright Law and Practice 122 
75  Section 51(1) of the Nigerian Copyright Act. 
76  Section 51(1) of the Nigerian Copyright Act. 
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3.3 Authorship under the SA Copyright Act 
Like the Nigerian Copyright Act, the SA Copyright Act does not provide a 
general definition of the term "author". Instead, it defines author in terms of 
the works falling under copyright protection. In other words, author is 
defined by reference to specific works protected under the SA Copyright 
Act. In this regard, the author of a literary, artistic or musical work is defined 
as the person who creates the work.77 Also, the SA Copyright Act regards 
the author of a cinematograph film and a sound recording as the person by 
whom the arrangements for the making of the film or sound recording were 
made.  
The SA Copyright Act simply regards the author of a broadcast as the 
broadcaster,78 while it defines the author of a computer programme as the 
person who exercised control over the making of the computer programme. 
Similarly, the SA Copyright Act defines an author of a computer-generated 
work to mean the person by whom arrangements necessary for the creation 
of the work were undertaken.79 The definition of the author of photographs 
under the SA Copyright Act will be examined in the sixth part below. 
3.4 Resolving the authorship question 
The foregoing definitions still do not completely resolve the authorship 
question within the Nigerian and South African context. For instance, it 
seems easy to determine the author of a cinematographic film. This is so 
because arrangements for the making of a cinematographic film or sound 
recording have been held to essentially relate to financial arrangements.80 
Thus, the person who makes financial arrangements will be regarded as the 
author of such a work. However, it would not be easy to determine how a 
person qualifies as a maker or creator of a literary or musical work under 
the Nigerian and SA Copyright Acts. As will become apparent in the sixth 
part below, the author of photographs cannot also be easily defined under 
both Acts.  
Indeed, the Nigerian and SA Copyright Acts do not provide concrete criteria 
for a general definition of the concept of authorship. However, it is clear from 
                                            
77  Section 1(1) of the SA Copyright Act. 
78  Section 1(1) of the SA Copyright Act. 
79  Section 1(1) of the SA Copyright Act. 
80  See Century Communications Ltd v Mayfair Entertainment UK Ltd 1993 EMLR 335; 
Adventure Film Productions v Tully 1993 EMLR 376. 
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the definitions, and this is confirmed by case law,81 that the authorship 
question is generally limited to natural and juristic persons.82 In addition, the 
authorship question is a matter of law and fact,83 and a copyist would not be 
regarded as an author.84 To be identified as an author, a person must show 
that the copyright work in question is original to him.85 The question of 
originality in relation to authorship is another matter entirely. This will be 
briefly discussed in the sixth part in relation to the authorship of photographs 
in Nigeria and South Africa against the backdrop of the monkey selfie case.  
Ginsburg's principles can be relied upon when considering the authorship 
question within the Nigerian and South African contexts. This will become 
apparent in the sixth part below when the provisions of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act and SA Copyright Act relating to the authorship of 
photographs will be examined. However, it is important to briefly determine 
the related concept of copyright ownership, and subjective rights.  
4 Copyright ownership under the Nigerian Copyright Act 
and SA Copyright Act 
Copyright ownership rights have both internal and external effects. The 
internal effect of copyright ownership reflects in the power of authors to 
"control the integrity of their works and benefit from their exploitation".86 On 
the other hand, the external effect is manifest in the ability to control the 
manufacture and distribution of a copyright work, which in turn attracts 
investments and helps to optimise the economic benefits from the 
exploitation of the work.87  
The inquiry into the concept of copyright ownership would lead to an 
analysis of the Nigerian Copyright Act and the SA Copyright Act. This is so 
because these statutes determine the extent of the ownership of copyright 
in a work. Even so, as has now been already too frequently repeated, the 
author is generally vested with the first ownership of copyright in a work. 
                                            
81  Feldman v EMI Music SA (Pty) Ltd/ EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 1 
(SCA); Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 458 
(SCA) (hereafter, Haupt v BMI). 
82  Also see ss 2 and 3 of the Nigerian Copyright Act; ss 3 and 4 of the SA Copyright 
Act.  
83  Asein Nigerian Copyright Law and Practice 113. 
84  See ICIC (Directory Publishers) Ltd v Ekko Delta (Nig) Ltd 1977-1989 2 IPLR 32; 
Haupt v BMI. 
85  Oriakhogba 2015 SAIPLJ 40. 
86  Seignette "Authorship, Copyright Ownership" 115. 
87  Seignette "Authorship, Copyright Ownership" 115.  
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Every other person derives ownership from the author. Ownership may be 
vested by agreement in the form of assignments, and exclusive or non-
exclusive licences between the author and the subsequent owner.88 Also, 
the ownership of copyright may pass by way of succession: that is, from the 
author to the beneficiaries of his estate.89 Furthermore, it may vest 
depending on the relationship between the author and the person deriving 
ownership from the author. Such a relationship may be that of 
employer/employee or commissioner/independent contractor. In such 
circumstances, the vesting of ownership varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  
For instance, the Anglo-American approach is to vest the ownership of 
works created by an author in the course of his employment or in the course 
of carrying out a commissioned work on the author's employer or the person 
who commissioned the work, except where the author has agreed otherwise 
with his employer or the person who commissioned the work as the case 
may be.90 This same approach also seems prevalent in Africa.91 It may be 
said that in the jurisdictions with this approach, placing ownership of 
copyright in works made in the course of employment or pursuant to a 
commission on the employer or commissioning party seems to be the 
general rule. The justification of this approach may be found in the 
presumption that in such circumstances, the employer or commissioning 
party is the person who bears the risks involved in the "creation, production, 
aggregation, marketing and presentation of the work"92 and, as such, should 
be conferred with ownership. However, Asein has dismissed the approach 
as unfair to the author because it "goes against the spirit of creativity and 
could result in a veiled rip-off on the author who is supposed [...] to be the 
primary object of the protection provided by the copyright system."93 Even 
so, the approach does not affect the moral rights of authors; neither does it 
change the fact that the subsistence of copyright must be determined in 
relation to the author.94 
                                            
88  Section 11 of the Nigerian Copyright Act; s 22 of the SA Copyright Act. 
89  Section 11 of the Nigerian Copyright Act; s 22 of the SA Copyright Act. 
90  For instance, see s 11 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988; s 201 
of the US Copyright Act, 1976; ss 35(5) and (6) of the Australian Copyright Act 63 of 
1968; s 13(3) of the Canadian Copyright Act c C-42, RSC 1985. 
91  For instance, see s 11 of the Gambian Copyright Act, 2004; s 7 of the Ghanaian 
Copyright Act, 2005; s. 31(1) of the Kenyan Copyright Act, 2001; s 15(4) of the 
Tanzanian Copyright Act, 1999; s 10(3) of the Zambian Copyright and Performance 
Act 1994; s 14(5) of the Zimbabwean Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act, 2000. 
92  Seignette "Authorship, Copyright Ownership" 115. 
93  Asein 2007 IIC 299. 
94  Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-42 para. 5.3.11. 
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South Africa also adopts the Anglo-American approach. Specifically, it is 
contained in section 21 of the SA Copyright Act and it is firmly established.95 
However, special provisions are made in respect of the ownership of 
copyright in works produced from publicly or state financed research and 
development in South Africa. These provisions are contained in the 
Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and 
Development Act 51 of 2008 (PFRD Act). An in-depth analysis of the PFRD 
Act is beyond the scope of this work.96 However, the PFRD Act dictates the 
ownership of copyright in works created from state-financed research.97 It 
does not apply to the ownership of copyright works like theses, 
dissertations, articles, handbooks, or any other publication, which is 
associated with conventional academic work in the ordinary course of 
business.98 According to Dean, copyright ownership in the works falling 
within the purview of the PFRD Act is  
conferred on the person (including a juristic person) receiving the funding. 
That person [...] is not necessarily the author of the work, and in most 
instances would be the institution at which, or under the auspices of which, 
the author is engaged in study or research.99 
The position in Nigeria is different from the Anglo-American approach. Here, 
the pre-eminence of the author as far as copyright ownership goes seems 
to be maintained. Put differently, author-ownership of copyright seems to be 
the general rule under the Nigerian Copyright Act.100 Accordingly, in Nigeria, 
the ownership of copyright in both commissioned works and works authored 
in the course of employment vests in the author.101 The author may waive 
this right by a written stipulation in the contract between him and his 
employer or the party commissioning the work.102  
Apart from this distinction, Nigeria and South Africa have the same 
approach to the ownership of copyright works published in newspapers, 
                                            
95  See King v South African Weather Services 2009 3 SA 13 (SCA); National Soccer 
League t/a Premier Soccer League v Gidani (Pty) Ltd 2014 2 All SA 461 (GJ). 
96  Generally, see Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-45 – 1-48, para 
5.6; Tong 2010 JIPLP 409; Ncube et al "Effects of the South African IP Regime" 282; 
Hobololo 2015 SAIPLJ 1; Bansi and Reddy 2015 Procedia 185. 
97  Sections 3 and 4 of the PFRD Act. 
98  Section 1 of the PFRD Act. 
99  Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-46 para 5.6.4. 
100  It should be noted that this has not always been the case in Nigeria. S 9 of the defunct 
Copyright Decree of 1970 adopted the Anglo-American approach. See Sonora Gentil 
v Tabansi Agencies Ltd 1977-1989 2 IPLR 1-31; Joseph Ikhuoria v Campaign 
Services Ltd & Anor 1977-1989 2 IPLR 316-335. 
101  Sections 10(2)(a) and (b) of the Nigerian Copyright Act. 
102  Sections 10(2)(a) and (b) of the Nigerian Copyright Act. 
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magazines and periodicals. In such circumstances, the proprietor of the 
newspaper, magazine or periodical is conferred with the ownership of the 
copyright in the work  
in so far as the copyright relates to publication of the work in any newspaper, 
magazine or similar periodical or to reproduction of the work for the purpose 
of its being so published, but in all other respects the author shall be the owner 
of any copyright subsisting in the work.103  
Another similarity shared by the copyright systems of both countries relates 
to the ownership of copyright works created under the direction or control of 
the government or prescribed international bodies. In such circumstances, 
the ownership of copyright vests in the government of the respective 
countries or the particular prescribed international body as the case may 
be.104 
5 Copyright ownership and the concept of subjective 
rights 
From the discussion so far, it is apparent that the author of a work is the 
default owner of copyright in a work under the Nigerian Copyright Act and 
the SA Copyright Act. Also, the author must be either a natural or a juristic 
person as the case may be. As seen from the discussion so far, the 
requirement of a natural or juristic person as author is linked to issues of 
transfer and succession in respect of copyright ownership as these can be 
resolved only by reference to the human author or the juristic author as the 
case may be.105 Moreover, ownership derived by way of employment 
contracts or commissions can be made possible only by reference to the 
human author. Thus, ascribing authorship to non-human animals will have 
serious implications on the exercise of ownership rights over copyright 
works.  
The implications may be better explained through the lens of the concept of 
subjective rights. The concept of subjective rights connotes the relationship 
or correlation between a legal subject and a legal object.106 A legal subject 
can be either a natural or a juristic person, but it cannot be a non-human 
                                            
103  Section 21(1)(b) of the SA Copyright Act; s 10(3) of the Nigerian Copyright Act. See 
Peter Obe v. Grapevine Communications Ltd 2003-2007 5 IPLR 354-384. 
104  Sections 5 and 21(2) of the SA Copyright Act; ss 4 and 10(5) of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act; Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Plc 2002 ZASCA 11 
(25 March 2002). 
105  Naruto v Slater III 16-18. 
106  Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer 1977 4 SA 376 (T); Kain v Kahn 1986 4 
SA 251 (C). 
CB NCUBE & DO ORIAKHOGBA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  19 
 
animal. On the other hand, legal objects are things: movable or immovable 
(including non-human animals); corporeal or incorporeal.107 The meaning of 
the concept of subjective rights is two-fold. First, it is the right or entitlement 
which a legal subject, supported by a legal regime, possesses over a legal 
object. This right empowers the legal object to use, enjoy and/or dispose 
the legal object within the boundaries of the law conferring the right. 
Secondly, and flowing from the first, the concept connotes the capacity of 
the legal object to sue third parties against undue interference with the 
object, or to authorise third parties to use the object.108  
Although the subjective rights concept is firmly established in South African 
law, it is also relevant within the Nigerian context especially as it relates to 
copyright ownership and suing for copyright infringement. Generally, only 
natural and juristic persons have legal personality in Nigeria. Thus, only 
such persons can validly initiate legal action in Nigerian courts. Non-juristic 
persons, such as non-human animals, do not have right of action. Neither 
can an action be instituted against them.109 Specifically, sections 16 and 19 
of the Nigerian Copyright Act limit rights of action for copyright infringement 
to owners, assignees and exclusive licensees of the copyright, and 
collecting societies approved by the Nigerian Copyright Commission. 
Moreover, the subjective rights concept aligns with the theories that have 
been advanced for the justification of intellectual property generally, and 
copyright in particular. From a review of authoritative literature, Fisher110 
summarised the theories into the natural rights theory, utilitarian theory, 
economic theory and the social planning theory. A discussion of these 
theories is beyond the scope of this work. It suffices to note that the theories, 
taken together, identify the personality of the author111 (a natural or juristic 
person) as the centre-point of copyright law. Thus, copyright is justified as 
a means of enabling authors to derive some reward or compensation for 
their skill and labour, while promoting creativity for the greater societal good.  
In effect, within the context of copyright law, the concept of subjective rights 
implies the entitlement or power of the author (a legal subject) to claim 
                                            
107  Generally, see Du Plessis Introduction to Law. 
108  Van der Merwe 2013 De Jure 1039; Du Plessis Introduction to Law. 
109  See Fawehinmi v NBA (No 2) 1989 2 NWLR Pt 106 558; Access Bank v Agege Local 
Government 2016 LPELR-40491 (CA). 
110  Fisher Date Unknown https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf. 
111  For a discussion within the context of the Monkey Selfie case, see Bakhariev 2015 
https://www.law.lu.se/webuk.nsf/(MenuItemById)/JAMR32exam/$FILE/The%20Cha
nging%20Concept%20of%20Authorship.%20Case%20of%20A%20Monkey%20Se
lfie,%20Iegor%20Bakhariev.pdf. 
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ownership over the copyright a (legal object) in the copyright works. Subject 
to relevant copyright exceptions,112 the power of the author includes the 
right of the author to grant third parties access to the copyright works and to 
sue third parties for the infringement of copyright in the works.113 The power 
also includes the capacity of the author to transfer the ownership of the 
copyright by way of assignment, licences, or testament. If the author dies 
intestate, such ownership can pass to the beneficiaries of the author by the 
operation of law.114 Furthermore, the author's power over the copyright in a 
work extends to the author's moral rights over the work. Moral rights are the 
inalienable rights of an authors to be identified as such in their works, and 
to prevent unauthorised changes of their works that are prejudicial to their 
honour and reputation.115  
6  Authorship of photographs under the Nigerian Copyright 
Act and the SA Copyright Act 
It was asserted above that for one to successfully claim authorship, it must 
be shown that the work under consideration is original to that person. A 
detailed examination of the concept of originality is beyond the scope of this 
paper.116 It suffices now to state that the Nigerian Copyright Act and the SA 
Copyright Act do not define originality.117 The Nigerian Copyright Act gives 
only an inkling by stating that sufficient effort must have been expended in 
creating the work.118 Nonetheless, existing authorities suggest that the 
concept of originality under the Nigerian Copyright Act follows the traditional 
UK style objectivist or "sweat of the brow" standards, which requires 
substantial skill and labour for originality.119  
The same can be said of the SA Copyright Act,120 although recent case law 
shows that the South African courts may be willing to plot a middle course 
                                            
112  For copyright exceptions, see Second Schedule to the Nigerian Copyright Act; s 12-
19B of the SA Copyright Act. 
113  Sections 15-16 of the Nigerian Copyright Act; ss 23-25 of the SA Copyright Act. 
114  Section 11 of the Nigerian Copyright Act; s 22 of the SA Copyright Act. 
115  Section 12 of the Nigerian Copyright Act; s 20 of the SA Copyright Act. 
116  See Harms 2013 PELJ 488; Abrams 1992 LCP 3; Gervais 2002 J Copyright Soc'y 
USA 949; Drassinower 2003-2004 UOLTJ 105. 
117  Section 2(1) of the SA Copyright Act. 
118  Section 1(2)(a) of the NCA. 
119  Ekpa 2014 KSUBJPL 76; Ugbe 2002 UniMaid LJ 23; Yemitan v Daily Times 1977-
1989 2 IPLR 141; Ifeanyi Okoyo v Prompt and Quality Services 2003-2007 5 IPLR 
117; Yeni Anikulapo-Kuti v Iseli 2003-2007 5 IPLR 53. 
120  Harms 2013 PELJ 488; Kalamazoo Division (Pty) Ltd v Gay 1978 2 SA 184 (C); 
Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Ltd v Rosenstein 1981 4 SA 123 (C); 
Saunders Valve Co Ltd v Klep Values (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 646 (T); Waylite Diaries 
CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 1 SA 645 (A). 
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towards a "skill, judgment and labour" standard in the definition of 
originality,121 just like their Canadian counterparts.122 This is deducible from 
the reliance by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in the 
case of Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence123 on the Canadian case of 
CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada.124 However, it is 
arguable that the SCA merely referred to the Canadian case only to the 
extent that the Canadian case emphasised that creativity was not required 
to show originality. 
The foregoing discussion is important here. As opposed to other copyright 
works such as literary works, it appears that photographs can be produced 
automatically, mechanically, and without any effort or mental input reflecting 
true originality by merely clicking the shutter.125 However, modern 
photography suggests that the creation of a photograph involves some 
intellectual and/or creative element,126 and as such would require a higher 
standard than the originality standard under the Nigerian Copyright Act and 
SA Copyright Act. Even so, cases decided based on such higher standards 
may afford useful guides when determining the authorship of a photograph 
under the SA Copyright Act in particular, because of the wording used in 
connoting authors of photographs. The cases will be discussed shortly. For 
now, it is important to highlight the provisions of the Nigerian Copyright Act 
and the SA Copyright Act relating to photographs. 
The Nigerian Copyright Act protects photographs, irrespective of artistic 
quality, as artistic works.127 Even so, it does not specifically define 
photographs. It merely excludes photographs comprised in a 
cinematograph film from protection as artistic works.128 However, the author 
of a photograph under the Nigerian Copyright Act is defined as the person 
who took the photograph.129 
Unlike the Nigerian Copyright Act, the SA Copyright Act defines a 
photograph to mean "any product of photography or of any process 
analogous to photography, but does not include any part of a cinematograph 
                                            
121  Haupt v BMI. 
122  See CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada 2004 1 SCR 339 (hereafter, 
CCH). 
123  Haupt v BMI. 
124  CCH. 
125  Harms 2013 PELJ 488; Guadamuz 2016 IP Review. 
126  Harris 2014 http://documents.jdsupra.com/60a4e7eb-5cc8-490e-83b4-f9815553 
a294.pdf. 
127  Section 51(1) of the NCA. 
128  Section 51(1) of the NCA. 
129  Section 51(1) of the NCA.  
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film".130 However, like the Nigerian Copyright Act, the SA Copyright Act 
protects photographs as artistic works, irrespective of their artistic quality.131 
Under the SA Copyright Act, the author of a photograph is the person 
responsible for the composition of the photograph.132 
A major distinction between the SA Copyright Act and Nigerian Copyright 
Act is apparent from the foregoing. The threshold for authorship of 
photographs under the Nigerian Copyright Act appears lower than that of 
the SA Copyright Act. This is underscored by the apparent difference 
between "composing" and "taking" a photograph. As shown in the cases 
examined below, "composing" a photograph connotes taking deliberate 
steps to arrange the visual elements, lighting, angle and ambience of an 
image. It is a calculated intellectual act with an anticipated outcome. It also 
involves the process of selection after initial composition and taking. On the 
other hand, "taking" a photograph would mean simply clicking or pressing 
the shutter of the camera.133 Furthermore, the cases examined below 
evince the dynamics of modern photography, which goes beyond the mere 
"taking" of a photograph to include the more intellectual act of "composing" 
the photograph. 
First is the case of Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH decided by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).134 The case concerns the portrait 
photograph of an Austrian teenage girl who was kidnapped and held captive 
for more than 8 years by her captors. Shortly after the girl was released, the 
press in Austria and Germany published the portrait photograph, which was 
taken by the claimant before the girl's kidnapping. The claimant objected to 
the publication of the portrait photograph on the grounds that she owned the 
copyright in the photograph. In their defence, the press claimed that that 
copyright did not subsist in the photograph, since it was merely a standard 
school portrait, and that it was not an original work. After restating the EU 
standard for originality, which is that the work must be the "author's own 
intellectual creation",135 the CJEU held that copyright exists in a photograph 
                                            
130  Section 1 of the SA Copyright Act. 
131  Section 1 of the SA Copyright Act 
132  Section 1 of the SA Copyright Act 
133  See Naryskin 2018 https://photographylife.com/what-is-composition-in-
photography/; Wienand 2012 
http://www.farrer.co.uk/Global/Briefings/10.%20Media%20Group%20Briefing/Copyr
ight%20protection%20in%20photographs.pdf; Reischl 2012 YEEH 533; Temple 
Island Collection Ltd v New English Teas Ltd 2012 EWPCC 1; Harms 2013 PELJ 
488. 
134  Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH (unreported) case number C-145/10 of 1 
December 2011 (hereafter Painer v Standard). 
135  Painer v Standard para 87. 
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if "the author was able to express his creative abilities in the production of 
the work by making free and creative choices."136 The CJEU further gives 
an indication of what "creative choices" in respect to photography involve, 
as follows:  
In the preparation phase, the photographer can choose the background, the 
subject's pose and the lighting. When taking a [...] photograph, he can choose 
the framing, the angle of view and the atmosphere created. Finally, when 
selecting the snapshot, the photographer may choose from a variety of 
developing techniques the one he wishes to adopt or, where appropriate, use 
computer software.137 
According to Logue, the CJEU  
focused on the preparation and execution of the photograph [...] but left open 
the possibility that post-photograph processing, including digital processing, 
could be sufficient to give rise to copyright in a photograph.138 
Nonetheless, the reasoning in the second case, Temple Island Collection 
Ltd v New English Teas Ltd,139 which applied the same standard as the first, 
further demonstrates modern photography. The case came before the UK 
Patent County Court. It involves a largely black and white image of the UK 
Parliament and Big Ben with a bright red bus travelling across Westminster 
Bridge. The photograph, owned by the claimant, was used on London 
souvenirs. The defendant, a tea company, made a similar picture for a 
publicity campaign. The court had to determine whether copyright existed 
in the photograph. The court gave judgment in favour of the claimant. In this 
regard, it held, per Birss QC, that: 
The claimant's work is original. It is the result of [the photographer's] own 
intellectual creation both in terms of his choices relating to the basic 
photograph itself: the precise motif, angle of shot, light and shade, illumination, 
and exposure and also in terms of his work after the photograph was taken to 
manipulate the image to satisfy his own visual aesthetic sense. The fact that 
it is a picture combining some iconic symbols of London does not mean the 
work is not an original work in which copyright subsists. The fact that, to some 
observers, icons such as Big Ben and a London bus are visual clichés also 
does not mean no copyright subsists. It plainly does.140 
It should be emphasised that the originality standards applied in the above 
cases differ from and are higher than the "sweat of the brow" standard that 
the Nigerian Copyright Act and SA Copyright Act align with. Still, it is 
                                            
136  Painer v Standard para 89. 
137  Painer v Standard paras 90-91. 
138  Logue 2014 LSG 26. 
139  Temple Island Collection Ltd v New English Teas Ltd 2012 EWPCC 1 (hereafter 
Temple Island). 
140  Temple Island 51. 
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arguable that the courts in South Africa would be willing to adopt the 
reasoning in the cases in relation to the authorship of a photograph. This 
may not be so in the case of Nigeria. This is because as the above cases 
show, modern photography includes "composing" (SA Copyright Act), and 
goes beyond the mere "taking" (Nigerian Copyright Act) of a photograph. 
Even so, it appears that the courts in both countries may find a better guide 
in the case of Antiquesportfolio Com Plc v Rodney Fitch and Company 
Ltd,141 where Neuberger J reasoned that 
[o]riginality presupposes the exercise of substantial independence, skill, 
labour, judgment and so forth. […] It will be evident that in photography there 
is room for originality in three respects. First, there may be originality which 
does not depend on creation of the scene or object to be photographed, or 
anything remarkable about its capture, and which resides in such specialities 
as angle of shot, light and shade, exposure, effects achieved by means of 
filters, developing techniques […]. Secondly, there may be creation of the 
scene or subject to be photographed […] Thirdly, a person may create a 
worthwhile photograph by being at the right place at the right time. Here his 
merit consists of capturing and recording a scene unlikely to recur.142 
6.1  Ginsburg's principles and authorship of photographs under the 
Nigerian Copyright Act and SA Copyright Act 
The judicial pronouncements in the cases examined above seem to 
resonate with Ginsburg's six principles of authorship. The preparation for 
the photograph as regards the setting of the camera to get a good 
ambience, light and shade, and general composition for the photograph are 
issues that place mind over muscle and machines (the first and second 
principles). Further, the preparation for the photograph along with the 
selection process after taking the photograph speaks to the issue of 
creativity. It is immaterial that the selection was done with the aid of 
computer software and other equipment (the fourth principle). In addition, 
although this is not always the case, the effort and creativity exerted in 
creating the photograph may presume the intent of authorship in favour of 
the photographer (the fifth principle). Such a presumption can be raised in 
favour of the person who generally arranges for the creation of the 
photograph even though the person did not click the shutter of the camera 
(the sixth principle). Importantly, the photograph must be shown to be 
original to the person (the third principle) and, as stated above, Neuberger 
J's reasoning above may form a better guide for Nigerian and South African 
                                            
141  Antiquesportfolio Com Plc v Rodney Fitch and Company Ltd 2001 ECDR 5 (hereafter 
Antiguesportfolio). 
142  Harms 2013 PELJ 488, 493. 
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courts in determining the originality of photographs under the Nigerian 
Copyright Act and SA Copyright Act respectively. 
In effect, assuming the monkey selfie case arose in Nigeria or South Africa, 
it is apparent that Naruto would not be regarded as the author of the 
photograph. The whole idea of authorship under the Nigerian Copyright Act 
and SA Copyright Act centres on a legal person (a human being or a 
corporation). The photograph must be a creation of the mind and the direct 
effort of a person who arranges for the photograph to be taken and actually 
clicks the shutter, or the indirect effort in the form of arranging for the 
photograph to be created. Granted, the threshold for authorship under the 
Nigerian Copyright Act is low, as shown above, such that it may seem that 
the clicking of the shutter by Naruto, as in the monkey selfie case, is enough 
to confer authorship upon it. However, the fact that the Nigerian Copyright 
Act relates to legal persons alone would displace any possible argument in 
favour of Naruto in Nigerian courts. 
Moreover, as shown above, the concepts of subjective rights in South 
African law and legal personality in Nigerian law connote the existence of a 
relationship between a legal subject (a natural or juristic person) and a legal 
object (a moveable or immovable property). In terms of copyright law, this 
relationship can exist only between a natural or juristic person and the 
copyright in a work. This is so because only a natural or juristic person can 
exercise and enjoy the ownership rights over copyright work. Only a natural 
person can transfer copyright, pass copyright on by way of succession, and 
initiate action for the enforcement of copyright against an alleged infringer. 
These rights cannot be exercised or enjoyed by a non-human animal such 
as Naruto in the monkey selfie case. 
7 Conclusion 
The parties in the monkey selfie case reached settlement. Still, it cannot not 
be said for sure that there is no possibility for future litigation on the monkey 
selfie. The case was not heard on the merit. It was truncated by a dismissal 
order because the US legislature never intended copyright protection under 
the US Copyright Act to extend to non-human animals. The dismissal order 
was recently confirmed by a three-judge panel of the appellate court. A 
judge of the appellate court called for the case to be heard en banc: that is, 
by an eleven-judge panel of the appellate court, which was denied. 
There is no general statutory definition of authorship under the Nigerian 
Copyright Act and the SA Copyright Act, but Ginsburg's six principles of 
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testing authorship are a very useful guide for this purpose. The principles 
are in tune with authorship in modern photography. For authorship of a 
photograph to be established under the Nigerian Copyright Act and the SA 
Copyright Act, it must be shown that a legal person (a human being or a 
corporation) created the photograph. The standard for establishing such 
authorship under the Nigerian Copyright Act is lower than it is under the SA 
Copyright Act. The Nigerian Copyright Act grants the authorship of a 
photograph to the person who "takes" it, while the SA Copyright Act confers 
authorship on the person who composed the photograph.  
Authors are owners of copyright by default under the Nigerian Copyright Act 
and the SA Copyright Act. Such authors must be natural or juristic persons 
depending on the nature of the copyright work in question. In effect, only 
natural or juristic persons can own the copyright in a photograph under the 
Nigerian Copyright Act and the SA Copyright Act.  
Therefore, assuming the monkey selfie case originated from Nigeria or 
South Africa, the courts in the countries would not reach a different 
conclusion from the one made by the district court in the dismissal hearing. 
Indeed, the Nigerian Copyright Act and the SA Copyright Act do not 
envisage the conferral of authorship in particular, and copyright ownership 
in general, to a non-human animal.  
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